Imagine for a moment the position of
counsel employed to defend a suit involving
some delicate chemical invention, or a subtle
point of science. The man of law, although
a good Latinist, would nevertheless be at his
wits' end to understand one single iota of the
atomic theory, to fathom the mysteries of
free and latent caloric, or to probe the depths
of the "Pharmacopœia Londinensis", with
its terrific array of Subacetates, Protocarbonates,
and Supersulphates.

About seven years since I was interested
in some valuable improvements in electric
telegraphs, and applied for protection for
them by Letters Patent. I was opposed
by one of the great electrical Professors of
the day, on the ground that my invention
was neither more nor less than an infringement
of his own patented discoveries.
Counsel had of course to be engaged on both
sides; and, inasmuch as the points in dispute
were of a specially scientific character, my
barrister underwent several most severe
drillings, in the hope that I should enable him
to argue my case. Never shall I forget the
bewilderment and annoyance he suffered in
his anxious endeavours to master the distinctive
technicalities of the electric science.
How he floundered amongst negative poles,
and positive currents; how he impaled himself
upon the points of "contacting needles."
He would have given a dozen new silk gowns
to have mastered but one half of what I
vainly endeavoured to drum into his mind
and memory. Was it indeed possible that
in a few short hours he could be expected to
comprehend the inner difficulties of a science
which had occupied my time and anxious
thoughts for years?

As a scientific forlorn-hope, I took my
counsel to my laboratory; and set the model-
telegraph in action in his presence. I soon
found, however, that I was making matters
worse instead of better. The complicated
apparatus, the labyrinth of wires, the maze
of chemical terms, the entire novelty of the
scene, completely scattered from the lawyer's
brain the small conception he had previously
formed of the process. It was in vain that I
discoursed upon the "metallic circuit;" he
shook his head and intimated that that was a
circuit of which he was not a member. The
mention of "battery" he connected in some
way with an assault case; and, when I endeavoured
to explain the nature of "lateral
metallic contacts," it was clear that he imagined
I was alluding insidiously to his fees.
Nor was my opponent's counsel in any better
plight. The judge was still more puzzled
with the conflicting claims, and so completely
blended the two opposing inventions in one
heterogeneous whole, that in the depth of his
chaotic bewilderment he decided on doing
that which under a wholesome state of things
should have been done in the first instance;
he referred the case to a practical and scientific
arbitrator; thus in fact, at once constituting
a most competent Tribunal of Commerce in
the person of Professor Faraday.

It is true that in certain cases a special
jury is formed, composed of men supposed to
be particularly versed in the matter in hand;
yet, although that very expedient demonstrates
the desirableness of practical tribunals,
the special jury is too often hampered and
perplexed rather than aided by the laboured
pleading of learned counsel; who deem it
their duty to talk for a certain time very
wide of the subject. In these cases, too,
the matter resting virtually with the jury,
the judge— who cannot and does not attempt
to form any opinion apart from theirs—
becomes a mere automaton.

It is not long since a circumstance occurred
in connection with one of those special jury
cases, which bears so strongly upon the
point I am anxious to illustrate, that I cannot
refrain from relating it. Like my own case,
it was a contested point of patent-right; the
invention being a machine of peculiar construction
and application. As usual, counsel
floundered dreadfully amidst cog-wheels,
sockets, pinions, pistons, bearings, coupling-boxes,
and cranks. The special jury had to
depend entirely upon the witnesses to form
the faintest judgment on the merits of the
competing machines.

When counsel had finished torturing the
principal witness for the plaintiff, the foreman
of the jury— a thoroughly practical and
shrewd man of the world— requested him
to be so good as to repeat carefully his description
of the plaintiff's machine; in order
that he might commit it to paper, and thus
prevent any misconception. The witness
complied; and on the completion of his
details, he was told that as he had been
a long time in the witness-box he would not
just then be called upon to hear the paper
read over to him, but that it should be
done on his being called up for re-examination.
The chief engineering witness on the
other side was requested, in a similar manner,
to detail most minutely the several parts of
his employer's machinery; and, having done
so, was in like manner desired to stand on
one side for the present; the foreman taking
down his words also. Further evidence was
taken; and eventually the two engineers
were recalled separately, when the foreman
of the jury, having read over the accounts
of the two distinct machines, asked each of
them if they felt positive that the description
therein given was a true and full explanation
of their respective employers' inventions.
They felt no sort of hesitation in declaring
that they did so most completely.

The foreman then addressed the Court,
and begged it to observe as a means of testing
the value of the evidence they had just
received, that he had read the description of
the defendant's machine to the plaintiff's
witness, and that of the plaintiff to the
defendant's witness, and that they had thus